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Constitutional Limits on Evidentiary Forfeiture
by Wrongdoing Among Conspirators
Christopher Petroni*
Four recent decisions in the federal courts of appeals have combined the evidentiary
doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing with imputed substantive criminal liability among
conspirators under Pinkerton v. United States. According to this augmented rule—
called the “Cherry rule” after the Tenth Circuit opinion that first enunciated it—a
witness’s out-of-court statement is admissible against a defendant if a co-conspirator
wrongfully silenced the witness in a manner that was within the scope and in
furtherance of the conspiracy, and was reasonably foreseeable. This expansion of the
forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine is inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment’s
Confrontation Clause for two reasons: it was not contemplated at early common law
and it leads to forfeiture of the confrontation right based only on a pretrial
determination of guilt. In addition, even if the Cherry rule were compatible with the
Confrontation Clause, due process constrains its application short of Pinkerton’s logical
extent. Courts should reject or limit the Cherry rule accordingly.

* B.S., 2005, Montana State University; J.D., 2013, University of California Hastings College of
the Law. Thanks to Professor Rory Little for the edits and encouragement.
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Introduction
Efforts to prosecute criminal conspiracies encounter a persistent
obstacle: the objects of prosecution will coerce, threaten, and even kill
witnesses to keep them away from court. The doctrine of forfeiture by
wrongdoing evolved to combat this practice. In the federal system, when
a criminal defendant (or any party to any federal litigation, civil or
criminal) acts wrongfully to silence a witness, the witness’s out-of-court
statements will be admissible against the defendant.1 Federal courts have
adapted the doctrine to the frequent situations where a conspiracy
defendant was complicit in witness tampering behind the scenes, but not
directly responsible for the wrongful conduct itself.2
In 2000, the Tenth Circuit expanded the scope of the federal
forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine by incorporating the theory of coconspirator liability set out in Pinkerton v. United States into the
doctrine.3 The Fourth, Seventh, and D.C. Circuits later followed suit.4
Under this approach—commonly referred to as the Cherry rule after the
case in which it was first adopted—a witness’s statement is admissible
against a defendant if a co-conspirator wrongfully and intentionally made
the witness unavailable, that wrongful act was within the scope and in
furtherance of the conspiracy, and the act was reasonably foreseeable.5
The federal forfeiture-by-wrongdoing provision, codified as Federal
Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), acts as an exception not only to the
exclusion of hearsay, but also to the right to confront witnesses.6 The
Cherry rule is also an exception to the confrontation right.7 Cherry,
however, is inconsistent with the modern understanding of the
Confrontation Clause. First, the Supreme Court has restricted the scope
of any exceptions to the Clause to how common law courts understood
them at the time the Sixth Amendment was ratified. As far as the
common law courts’ application of the forfeiture doctrine can be
measured from a remote, modern vantage point, they do not appear to

1. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982) (holding that a defendant
forfeits the right to object to admission of a witness’s statement if he was involved in the witness’s murder
“through knowledge, complicity, planning or in any other way”); Olson v. Green, 668 F.2d 421, 429 (8th
Cir. 1982) (concluding that a defendant or “someone acting on his behalf” may forfeit the defendant’s
objections to a witness’s out-of-court statements by making the witness unavailable).
3. See United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 820 (10th Cir. 2000) (“We therefore hold that a coconspirator may be deemed to have ‘acquiesced in’ the wrongful procurement of a witness’s unavailability
for purposes of Rule 804(b)(6) and the waiver by misconduct doctrine when the government can satisfy
the requirements of Pinkerton [v. United States], 328 U.S. [640, 647–48 (1946)].”).
4. United States v. Dinkins, 691 F.3d 358, 385 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d
336, 364 & n.24 (D.C. Cir. 2006); United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 963–64 (7th Cir. 2002).
5. Cherry, 217 F.3d at 820.
6. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006); see also Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 360 (2008).
7. Cherry, 217 F.3d at 820.
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have imputed forfeiture by wrongdoing among co-conspirators.8 Second,
as the Court observed of a California forfeiture statute in Giles v.
California, admitting statements against defendants under the Cherry rule
amounts to stripping them of the confrontation right based on a pretrial
determination of guilt.9
Further, the Cherry rule fuses Rule 804(b)(6) with the Pinkerton
doctrine, which has been criticized as overbroad since its adoption in
1946. Several circuit courts have restricted the breadth of Pinkerton’s
application under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. As the
Cherry rule incorporates the Pinkerton doctrine wholesale, any and all
due process limits on Pinkerton should apply to Cherry as well.
Part I of this Article summarizes the relevant law. Part II explains
why the Cherry rule is inconsistent with the Confrontation Clause, both
because an analog apparently did not exist at common law and because
Cherry premises forfeiture of the confrontation right on a pretrial
determination of guilt. Part III surveys criticism of Pinkerton more
generally in order to measure the permissible scope of its application,
and therefore, of its incorporation into the Cherry rule. Part III also
examines courts of appeals decisions concluding that due process
restrains the scope of vicarious liability under Pinkerton. Finally, Part III
applies those due process restraints to the Cherry rule.
In short, the Cherry rule violates the Confrontation Clause, and
even if it does not, due process requires that its application be restricted.
Courts should abandon or limit it accordingly.

I. The Relevant Law
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .
—U.S. Const. amend. VI.

This Part first examines how Crawford v. Washington defined the
modern contours of the Confrontation Clause. Second, it addresses
Giles, in which the Supreme Court applied Crawford’s lens to the
forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine. Third, it summarizes the Tenth
Circuit’s opinion in United States v. Cherry. Finally, it examines the

8. Commentators have sharply criticized the Supreme Court’s historical analysis of the forfeitureby-wrongdoing doctrine. See Giles, 554 U.S. at 380 (Souter, J., concurring in part) (observing that “the
early cases on the exception were not calibrated finely enough to answer the narrow question here”); id.
at 390–98 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (finding that “no case limits forfeiture” as Justice Scalia’s opinion for the
Court suggested); Adrienne Rose, Note, Forfeiture of Confrontation Rights Post-Giles: Whether a CoConspirator’s Misconduct Can Forfeit a Defendant’s Right to Confront Witnesses, 14 N.Y.U. J. Legis. &
Pub. Pol’y 281, 31213 & nn.17172 (2011) (summarizing academic criticism of the Court’s analysis).
Questions of reliability aside, the Court’s historical approach to the Confrontation Clause is the law, and
the historical reasoning that the Court followed in Giles also calls for rejecting the Cherry rule.
9. Giles, 554 U.S. at 365.

Petroni_18 (EGK).DOC (Do Not Delete)

February 2015]

3/21/2015 4:25 PM

LIMITS ON EVIDENTIARY FORFEITURE

489

opinions of other circuits that have adopted the Cherry rule after Giles
and in particular, the Fourth Circuit’s attempt to reconcile Cherry with
the Giles court’s interpretation of the forfeiture doctrine.
A. CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON Tied the Scope of the Confrontation
Clause to Its Historical Application
Until 2004, the Confrontation Clause permitted admission of an outof-court statement against a criminal defendant only if it was sufficiently
reliable, an inquiry that centered on whether the statement fell within a
“‘firmly rooted hearsay exception’ or b[ore] ‘particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.’”10 In Crawford, the Supreme Court concluded that
determining an out-of-court statement’s admissibility based on its reliability
was inconsistent with the Confrontation Clause’s original meaning.11
Noting that the “principal evil” against which the Clause was directed
was the use of ex parte witness examinations against defendants, the
Court adopted a categorical approach: statements that are “testimonial” are
strictly inadmissible unless the declarant was unavailable and was subject
to cross-examination on a prior occasion, while nontestimonial statements
do not implicate the Confrontation Clause at all.12 The Court allowed for
exceptions to the categorical exclusion of testimonial statements, but
only those that were “established at the time of the founding.”13
Forfeiture by wrongdoing is such an exception.14
B. GILES V. CALIFORNIA Limited the Forfeiture-by-Wrongdoing
Exception to Its Historical Understanding
In Giles, the Supreme Court held that a California statute setting
out a hearsay exception for forfeiture by wrongdoing was inconsistent
with the Confrontation Clause.15 The California exception provided for
admitting a declarant’s out-of-court statements against a defendant who

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60 (2004) (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)).

Id.
Id. at 50–54.
Id. at 54.
Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 360 (2008); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 832 (2006);

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62. As the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine (and Rule 804(b)(6), which
codifies it, Giles, 554 U.S. at 367; Davis, 547 U.S. at 833) is an exception to the confrontation right,
Crawford’s distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial statements is irrelevant to the scope of
the doctrine’s application. Testimonial statements by intentionally silenced witnesses are admissible
under the doctrine, and nontestimonial statements are similarly admissible under the hearsay
exception in Rule 804(b)(6). On the other hand, the restriction of the scope of the Clause to its
historical application is highly relevant, because it ties the modern interpretation of the forfeiture-bywrongdoing doctrine to its application in 1791. See Giles, 554 U.S. at 358 (“We therefore ask whether
the theory of forfeiture by wrongdoing accepted by the California Supreme Court is a founding-era
exception to the confrontation right.”).
15. Giles, 554 U.S. at 353, 377.
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harmed or threatened to harm the declarant, without any requirement
that the defendant intended to make the declarant unavailable.16 Justice
Scalia’s opinion for a plurality of the Court first noted that forfeiture by
wrongdoing was recognized as an exception to the confrontation right
when the Sixth Amendment was ratified, as Crawford requires.17 Justice
Scalia examined early common law cases applying the forfeiture-bywrongdoing exception and concluded that the language the decisions
used implied that the purpose of the defendant’s wrongful conduct must
have been to make the witness unavailable.18 He buttressed this
interpretation with several English and early American murder cases in
which the victims’ statements were offered against the defendant.19 In
each of these cases, the statements were admitted only if the defendant
had a previous opportunity to confront the victim or if they qualified as
dying declarations.20 Justice Scalia reasoned that if, as the modern
California statute provided, proof of intent to silence the witness was not
required to show forfeiture by wrongdoing, the prosecutors would have
sought to introduce the statements on that basis.21 Recalling from
Crawford that only those exceptions to the confrontation right that were
“established at the time of the founding” may limit the scope of the right
today, the Court held that this inferred common law requirement of a
design “to prevent a witness from testifying” applies today as well.22
This historical reasoning won over only a plurality of the Court,
perhaps because the murder cases on which the plurality relied are too
slender a reed to support its sweeping conclusion. The two concurring
justices concluded that the early cases cited by the plurality “were not
calibrated finely enough to answer the narrow question” of whether
specific intent to silence the witness was required to invoke the forfeiture
doctrine.23 The three dissenting justices were puzzled at how the plurality
inferred the existence of a common law principle from the absence of
examples to the contrary, rather than affirmative evidence that early
courts recognized it.24 They developed a different explanation for the
prosecutors’ failure to introduce the victim’s statements in early murder
cases: whether or not the defendant’s purpose was to prevent the victim’s
testimony, the statements would be admissible only if the defendant had
had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.25 In those cases where the
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 357.
Id. at 359 (citing, e.g., Lord Morley’s Case, (1666) 6 How. St. Tr. 769 (H.L.) 771 (Eng.)).
Id. at 359–61.
Id. at 362–64.
Id.
Id. at 367.
Id. at 358, 368 (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004)).
Id. at 379–80 (Souter, J., concurring in part).
Id. at 393 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 394–95.
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prosecutor did not offer the statements, the defendant had not had this
opportunity, and therefore, any attempt to introduce them would have
been pointless.26 Regardless of the persuasiveness of the plurality’s
historical reasoning, however, the dissent did not dispute that, under
Crawford, the scope of the confrontation right remains tethered to its
“metes and bounds” in 1791.27
C. GILES Also Held That Forfeiture May Not Be Premised Merely
on a Pretrial Determination of Probable Guilt
A majority of the Court identified another reason for invalidating
the California forfeiture statute: it premised a finding of forfeiture on
nothing more than a pretrial determination that the defendant was
probably guilty of the wrongful act that silenced the witness.28 The Court
reasoned that “[t]he notion that judges may strip the defendant of a right
that the Constitution deems essential to a fair trial, on the basis of a prior
judicial assessment that the defendant is guilty as charged, does not sit
well with the right to trial by jury.”29 Similarly, Justice Souter reasoned
that “[i]f the victim’s prior statement were admissible solely because the
defendant kept the witness out of court by committing homicide,
admissibility of the victim’s statement to prove guilt would turn on
finding the defendant guilty of the homicidal act causing the absence.”30
In other words, a finding that the defendant forfeited her right to
confront the witness would rest on a pretrial determination that the
defendant was probably guilty of the wrongful act that silenced the
witness.31 “Equity demands something more than this near circularity
before the right to confrontation is forfeited, and more is supplied by
showing intent to prevent the witness from testifying.”32
D. The Tenth Circuit in CHERRY Extended PINKERTON Liability to
Evidentiary Forfeiture by Wrongdoing Under Rule 804(b)(6),
Before CRAWFORD and GILES
In Pinkerton, the Supreme Court held that a defendant is liable for a
substantive crime of a co-conspirator if the crime is (1) within the scope
and in furtherance of the conspiracy and (2) reasonably foreseeable.33 In

26. Id.
27. Id. at 383. For more critical analysis of the Giles plurality’s historical reasoning, see Rose,
supra note 8, at 313 nn.17172.
28. Giles, 554 U.S. at 365 (majority opinion); id. at 379 (Souter, J., concurring in part).
29. Id. at 365 (majority opinion) (emphasis in original).
30. Id. at 379 (Souter, J., concurring in part).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. 328 U.S. 640, 64748 (1946). Justice Douglas’s opinion for the majority stated these elements
not in the conjunctive, but in the disjunctive:
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2000, the Tenth Circuit applied the Pinkerton co-conspirator liability
principle in a context that Pinkerton itself did not anticipate: forfeiture
by wrongdoing under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6).34 Rule
804(b)(6) provides that an out-of-court statement is admissible “against a
party who wrongfully caused—or acquiesced in wrongfully causing—the
declarant’s unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result.”35
Under the Tenth Circuit’s rule (the “Cherry rule”), a defendant is
deemed to have forfeited her right to confront a witness if a coconspirator procured the witness’s unavailability and “the wrongful
procurement was in furtherance, within the scope, and reasonably
foreseeable as a necessary or natural consequence of [the] conspiracy.”36
In Cherry, five defendants were charged with involvement in a drug
conspiracy.37 The district court found that one of the defendants had
murdered a government informant, and held that the informant’s out-ofcourt statements38 were admissible against the killer, but not her coconspirators, under Rule 804(b)(6).39 The district court found that the coconspirators had not forfeited their hearsay and confrontation objections
to the informant’s statements because no evidence suggested that they
were responsible for killing the informant.40 On interlocutory appeal, the

A different case would arise if the substantive offense committed by one of the conspirators
was not in fact done in furtherance of the conspiracy, did not fall within the scope of the
unlawful project, or was merely a part of the ramifications of the plan which could not be
reasonably foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement.

Id. However, if liability will not be imputed among co-conspirators if any one of the elements is not
present, this necessarily implies that all elements must be present in order for imputed liability to
attach. Lower courts have since applied the Pinkerton rule to require that the substantive criminal act
is within the scope and in furtherance of the conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable. E.g., United
States v. Min, 704 F.3d 314, 324 n.9 (4th Cir. 2013); United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 71 (2d Cir.
2012); United States v. Madrid, 495 F. App’x 427, 430 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. LopezZamoran, 494 F. App’x 802, 804 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v. Smith, 697 F.3d 625, 635 (7th Cir.
2012); United States v. Burwell, 690 F.3d 500, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2012); United States v. Irvin, 682 F.3d
1254, 1274 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Norman, 465 F. App’x 110, 117 n.10 (3d Cir. 2012); United
States v. Elder, 682 F.3d 1065, 1073 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. Diaz, 670 F.3d 332, 342 (1st Cir.
2012); United States v. Lopez, 403 F. App’x 362, 37778 (11th Cir. 2010); United States v. Adkins, 372
F. App’x 647, 650–51 (6th Cir. 2010).
34. United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 820 (10th Cir. 2000).
35. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6).
36. Cherry, 217 F.3d at 820.
37. Id. at 813.
38. The Tenth Circuit did not describe the statements that the government sought to introduce,
saying no more than that it “moved to admit out-of-court statements by [the informant].” Id. at 813. The
nature or scope of the statements is irrelevant under Rule 804(b)(6), however, because misconduct
intended to silence a witness amounts to total forfeiture of the right to object to introduction of the
witness’s statements on hearsay and confrontation grounds. Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(6) advisory committee’s
note (1997); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 367 (2008); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006);
Cherry, 217 F.3d at 815.
39. Cherry, 217 F.3d at 814.
40. Id.
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government urged the Tenth Circuit to hold the statements admissible
and rule that Pinkerton co-conspirator liability applies to the evidentiary
forfeiture-by-wrongdoing rule.41 The court of appeals held that forfeiture
under Rule 804(b)(6) may be imputed among co-conspirators, reasoning
that Pinkerton liability strikes an “appropriate balance” between the
defendant’s interest in confronting adverse witnesses and the justice
system’s need to prevent witness tampering.42 The court therefore
reversed the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to
determine whether the informant’s murder was within the scope and in
furtherance of the conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable.43
Two years later, the Seventh Circuit followed the Tenth Circuit’s
example and applied Pinkerton co-conspirator liability to the forfeitureby-wrongdoing exception in Rule 804(b)(6).44
E. Subsequent Decisions by Circuit Courts Adopted the CHERRY
Rule, Sometimes with Modification, After CRAWFORD and GILES
Two circuit courts, the D.C. Circuit in United States v. Carson and
the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Dinkins, adopted the Cherry rule
after Crawford.45 The D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Carson did not address
whether the Supreme Court’s reinterpretation of the Confrontation
Clause in Crawford had any effect on the scope or validity of the Cherry
rule, devoting its reasoning on the question to a single footnote.46 The
Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Dinkins, on the other hand, followed both
Crawford and Giles and acknowledged that both required reexamination
of the constitutional reach of the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine.47
Accordingly, it set out to square the Cherry rule with Giles’s intent
requirement.
Like the Tenth Circuit, the Fourth Circuit in Dinkins reasoned that
importing co-conspirator liability under Pinkerton into the forfeiture-bywrongdoing doctrine would strike an “appropriate balance between” a
defendant’s confrontation right and the public interest in preventing
witness tampering.48 The court, therefore, adopted the Cherry rule in
nearly the same terms as the Tenth Circuit: a witness’s statement is
admissible against a defendant when her co-conspirator wrongfully
41. Id. at 813–16.
42. Id. at 820.
43. Id. at 821.
44. United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 96364 (7th Cir. 2002).
45. United States v. Dinkins, 691 F.3d 358, 385 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Carson, 455 F.3d
336, 364 & n.24 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
46. Carson, 455 F.3d at 364 n.24. The D.C. Circuit noted that the murdered witness’s statements were
likely testimonial, but found the distinction to be “of no moment” because the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing
exception applies to testimonial statements as well as nontestimonial statements. Id. at 363 n.22.
47. Dinkins, 691 F.3d at 382–84.
48. Id. at 384–85.
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procured the witness’s unavailability, and “the wrongful procurement
was in furtherance, within the scope, and reasonably foreseeable as a
necessary or natural consequence of an ongoing conspiracy.”49 The court
went on to observe, however, that the Supreme Court in Giles had
“clarified that the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception applies ‘only when
the defendant engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from
testifying.’”50 The Fourth Circuit reconciled Giles’s intent requirement
with Cherry’s allowance of forfeiture based only on reasonable
foreseeability by holding that a co-conspirator’s intentional misconduct that
silences a witness will lead to forfeiture of a defendant’s right to confront
that witness’s statements only if the government presents “evidence that the
defendant ‘engaged in conduct designed to prevent the witness from
testifying.’”51
The Dinkins court went on to find that the facts of the case before it
satisfied this modified Cherry rule.52 The defendant in Dinkins was
incarcerated when his co-conspirators murdered an informant.53 He had,
however, attempted to kill the same informant in the past, and
announced an intent to “go to the hospital and finish him off.”54 The
Fourth Circuit found that the defendant’s prior attempt on the
informant’s life made his successful murder by co-conspirators
reasonably foreseeable as required by Cherry.55 Similarly, the court
reasoned, the prior attempt showed evidence, on the defendant’s part, of
a “design” to make the informant unable to testify, as required by
Giles.56
Contrary to the observations of some commentators, Dinkins’s
attempt to square Cherry and Giles must be regarded a failure.57 If the
defendant must have personally intended to silence a witness, merely
that she should reasonably have foreseen a co-conspirator’s wrongful
attempt to do so is insufficient by definition. The Fourth Circuit’s
application of its refined Cherry rule illustrates the problem. The
defendant in Dinkins attempted to kill the informant with the purpose of
making him unavailable, and when the attempt failed, announced to his
co-conspirators the necessity of “finish[ing] the job.”58 The defendant’s

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 385.
Id. at 383 (quoting Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 359 (2008) (emphasis in original)).
Id. at 385 (quoting Giles, 554 U.S. at 359) (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 386.
Id.
See, e.g., Ruth A. Moyer, Comment, Setting Critical Limits on the Cherry Doctrine: The
Fourth Circuit Decision in United States v. Dinkins, 64 S.C. L. Rev. 1117, 1127 (2013) (“[T]he Dinkins
court adeptly reconciled the Cherry doctrine with the fundamental intent requirement of Giles.”).
58. Dinkins, 691 F.3d at 385.

Petroni_18 (EGK).DOC (Do Not Delete)

February 2015]

LIMITS ON EVIDENTIARY FORFEITURE

3/21/2015 4:25 PM

495

prior attempt on the witness’s life showed that he personally intended to
prevent the informant from testifying against him and his coconspirators. That the killing he personally set in motion was reasonably
foreseeable to him played no practical role in the court’s analysis. In
other words, inserting an intent requirement into the Cherry rule
rendered the foreseeability of the co-conspirators’ actions superfluous.
Put another way, the Dinkins court’s version of the Cherry rule is
akin to a criminal statute that simultaneously requires both intent and
negligence with regard to the proscribed result. The criminal law
generally recognizes that intent is a more culpable mental state than that
required for negligence, where reasonable foreseeability is key.59 The
Dinkins rule requires that the defendant, against whom the witness’s
statement is offered, harbor both intent and negligence with regard to
the act that procured the witness’s unavailability. A defendant who
should reasonably have foreseen that her co-conspirator would silence a
witness, that is, who harbored the less culpable mental state of
negligence, will not fall under the Dinkins rule unless she also harbored
the more culpable mental state of intent that the witness be silenced.
Inclusion of the more culpable mental state renders the less culpable one
purposeless.
To say that the Dinkins court failed to reconcile the Cherry rule
with Giles’s intent requirement is not to say that the two are necessarily
incompatible. As will be taken up in the next Part, recent commentators
have reached opposing conclusions on this question. This Article does
not propose a solution to the controversy, but concludes that the Cherry
rule is inconsistent with the Confrontation Clause for other reasons.

II. The CHERRY Rule Is Inconsistent with the Confrontation
Clause Under CRAWFORD and GILES
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Giles was announced,
commentators have asked whether its requirement that the defendant
acted with the intent to make the witness unavailable can be reconciled
with the Cherry rule. One commentator argues that the Court’s decision
in Giles precludes imputed forfeiture under Cherry because a “design to
prevent the witness from testifying” cannot be imputed from one
conspirator to another.60 This conclusion is based on the Giles Court’s

59. For example, of the Model Penal Code’s four mental states, purpose (equivalent to intent) is
the most culpable and negligence the least. Model Penal Code §§ 1.13(12), 2.02(2), 2.02(5), 2.02 cmt.
(2001). Under the Model Penal Code, a defendant was negligent if her failure to perceive a risk that
the proscribed result would occur was “a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable
person would observe in the actor’s situation.” Id. § 2.02(2)(d).
60. See Rose, supra note 8, at 318. In a similar vein, the Fourth Circuit apparently assumed that
Giles did not allow for imputation among conspirators of a “design[] to prevent the witness from
testifying.” Dinkins, 691 F.3d at 385.
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historical analysis and its reliance on the common law maxim that “no
one shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong.”61
Another author reaches the opposite conclusion: Giles and the
Cherry rule can coexist in harmony because one conspirator’s intent to
prevent a witness’s testimony may be imputed to her co-conspirators.62
The Giles Court itself did not direct lower courts not to impute one
conspirator’s “design to prevent a witness from testifying” to another.63
The majority did, according to the author, explain that the factual
context will affect whether a court may infer that a defendant intended to
render a witness unavailable.64 In particular, the Court addressed cases of
domestic violence, in which trial courts might infer from patterns of past
abuse that the abuser intended to isolate the victim from potential
avenues for relief.65 Similarly, a court may permissibly infer from the
collective efforts of a criminal conspiracy to foster a reputation for
violent retaliation against “snitches” that one conspirator’s intent to
silence a particular witness should be imputed to her fellows.66 Other
criminal doctrines, in which intent is imputed by operation of law, such as
transferred intent, felony murder, and even substantive liability under
Pinkerton where intent is an element of the crime, further suggest that
intent may be imputed for forfeiture purposes.67 Finally, the author
asserts that the Cherry rule is perfectly consistent with the forfeiture
doctrine’s aims of stripping defendants of the benefits of their
wrongdoing and of deterring future witness tampering.68
This Article does not attempt to resolve the controversy that these
commentators raise. Whether Giles’s central holding permits courts to
impute intent to prevent a witness’s testimony among conspirators, the
Cherry rule is inconsistent with the Confrontation Clause for two
unrelated reasons: (1) imputation of forfeiture by wrongdoing among
conspirators was unknown to the common law when the Sixth
Amendment was ratified; and (2) the Cherry rule premises forfeiture on
a pretrial determination of the defendant’s guilt.
61. Rose, supra note 8, at 314 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 159 (1878)).
62. Nathaniel Koslof, Note, Cherry Still on Top: How Pinkerton Concepts Continue to Govern
Co-Conspirator Forfeiture of Confrontation Rights Post-Giles, 55 B.C. L. Rev. 301, 327–28 (2014).
63. Id. at 317–18 (citing Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 377 (2008)).
64. Id. at 320.
65. Giles, 554 U.S. at 377.
66. Koslof, supra note 62, at 320–21.
67. Id. at 321–23.
68. Id. at 324–26. The Seventh Circuit also relied, in part, on this deterrence rationale when it
adopted the Cherry rule. United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 965 (7th Cir. 2002). It went on to
reject the argument that the Cherry rule permits one conspirator to be stripped of the confrontation
right involuntarily based on the wrongful conduct of another. Id. (citing Cherry, 217 F.3d at 823
(Holloway, J., dissenting)). The Court reasoned that the Cherry rule is tied to the defendant’s
intentional, wrongful conduct in participating in an illegal conspiracy, where wrongful action against a
witness is reasonably foreseeable. Id.
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A. Imputed Forfeiture Among Conspirators Did Not Exist at the
Time the Sixth Amendment Was Ratified
The crime of conspiracy was first enacted in England in the
fourteenth century, and was well established in the United States by the
end of the eighteenth.69 When conspiracy was charged against a
defendant, acts of co-conspirators taken in pursuit of the conspiracy were
imputed to the defendant for the purpose of establishing the conspiracy’s
existence.70 However, the Author has been unable to uncover a case
prior to the twentieth century in which a conspirator was deemed
criminally liable for her co-conspirator’s actions, apart from her liability
for the crime of conspiracy. It appears that American courts did not
begin imputing substantive criminal liability among conspirators until the
twentieth century, and the Supreme Court did not adopt the principle
until Pinkerton in 1946.71
Early common law treatises discuss the forfeiture rule without
mentioning forfeiture based on a co-conspirator’s conduct. For example,
Phillips & Amos wrote that a witness’s deposition was deemed
admissible against a defendant at trial if the witness was “kept away by
the practices” of the defendant.72 The treatise did not mention that a
defendant could be deemed to have forfeited any objection to admitting
the deposition if a co-conspirator kept the witness away.73 Similarly, an
1801 edition of Gilbert’s Law of Evidence provided that a coroner’s
examination of a witness would be admissible at trial if “the witness [was]

69. See 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *136 (describing the statutory crime of conspiracy
to falsely indict); Francis B. Sayre, Criminal Conspiracy, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 393, 395–96 (1922); see also
Case of Fries, 9 F. Cas. 924, 931 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 5127); Gardner v. Preston, 2 Day 205, 20910
(Conn. 1805); People v. Barrett, 1 Johns. 66, 75–76 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1806); Lambert v. People, 9 Cow.
578, 624 (N.Y. 1827); Cornwell v. State, 8 Tenn. (Mart. & Yer.) 147, 147 (Tenn. 1827).
70. Cornwell, 8 Tenn. (Mart. & Yer.) at 147; Gardner, 2 Day at 210 (citing 1 Edward H. East, A
Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown § 38 (1803)).
71. Developments in the Law—Criminal Conspiracy, 72 Harv. L. Rev. 922, 993–94 (1959)
[hereinafter Developments]; Note, Vicarious Liability for Criminal Offenses of Co-Conspirators,
56 Yale L.J. 371, 376 (1947) [hereinafter Vicarious Liability]. California courts held defendants liable
for the substantive crimes of co-conspirators “committed as a part of the conspiracy” before
Pinkerton. See Anderson v. Superior Court, 177 P.2d 315, 317 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1947). Anderson in
turn cited a number of pre-Pinkerton cases for that proposition. See People v. Kauffman, 92 P. 861,
862 (Cal. 1907) (noting that all parties who “conspire or combine together to commit any unlawful act”
are criminally liable for all acts by co-conspirators which are “probable and natural consequences” of
the conspiracy); People v. Welch, 264 P. 324, 327 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1928) (describing as “wellsettled” the principle that criminal liability for acts committed “during the life of the conspiracy and in
the furtherance of [its] accomplishment” is imputed among all conspirators); People v. Murphy, 200 P.
484, 488 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921) (“The established rule is that when a conspiracy to commit an
offense of a certain class is shown each conspirator is deemed guilty of every such crime committed in
furtherance of the conspiracy by any of the conspirators.”).
72. Samuel March Phillipps & Andrew Amos, A Treatise on the Law of Evidence 576 (8th
ed. 1838) (citation omitted).
73. Id. at 57677.
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detained and kept back from appearing by the means and procurement
of the prisoner.”74 No mention is made of whether the witness’s
examination would be similarly admissible against the defendant’s coconspirators. Neither treatise, however, addresses the question
specifically.
In contrast, at least one English case discusses whether a witness’s
out-of-court statement would be admissible against the co-conspirators
of the defendant who wrongfully silenced the witness.75 In R v. Scaife,
the Crown sought to introduce a witness’s statements against three
defendants charged with robbery.76 The evidence showed that only one
defendant was responsible for procuring the witness’s unavailability.77
The trial court allowed the statements to be read before the jury.78 On
appeal, the Court of Queen’s Bench considered the argument that the
deposition was properly admitted against all defendants because they
acted in combination in the charged felony.79 However, the Court held
that the statements were not admissible against all of the defendants
because only one was shown to have been responsible for preventing the
witness from testifying.80
Scaife cautions modern courts against imputing forfeiture of the
confrontation right among co-conspirators in the same manner as the
murder cases that Justice Scalia examined in Giles, and it supports the
conclusion more strongly than those cases. Justice Scalia reasoned that if
the early common law provided that a defendant forfeited any objection
to a witness’s statement merely by causing the witness’s unavailability,
prosecutors would have sought to introduce a murder victim’s statement
against the defendant on that theory.81 That prosecutors did not do so
demonstrates that a defendant was not deemed to forfeit the
confrontation right absent intent to make the witness unavailable.82
Unlike the cases that Justice Scalia examined in Giles, in Scaife the
Crown attempted to invoke the theory of forfeiture in question: it
attempted to introduce the statement of the silenced witness against all
of the codefendants, not merely the defendant responsible for keeping

74. Geoffrey Gilbert, The Law of Evidence 125 (James Sedgwick ed., 6th ed. 1801). Justice
Scalia cited similar language appearing in a 1756 edition of Gilbert on Evidence in Giles. Giles v.
California, 554 U.S. 353, 365 (2008) (citing Geoffrey Gilbert, Law of Evidence 140–41 (1756)).
75. R v. Scaife, (1851) 117 Eng. Rep. 1271 (Q.B.). Scaife is among the cases that the majority and
dissent in Giles cited in their respective discussions of the historical scope of the confrontation right.
Giles, 554 U.S. at 359, 366–67 (majority opinion); id. at 38283 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
76. Scaife, 117 Eng. Rep. at 1271.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 1273.
80. Id.
81. Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 362–64 (2008).
82. Id.
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the witness away. The Court of Queen’s Bench expressly rejected that
argument. The court’s affirmative rejection of the Crown’s invitation to
impute one co-venturer’s forfeiture of the right to confront a witness to
her co-conspirators demonstrates that the common law did not recognize
imputed forfeiture.
This argument, like the Court’s historical analysis in Giles, is not
especially persuasive on its own. The absence of any discussion that
forfeiture by wrongdoing was imputed among conspirators in the
treatises mentioned above is compatible with the contention that the
common law did not recognize such imputation, but these authorities are
“not calibrated finely enough to answer the narrow question” of whether
that contention is true.83 R v. Scaife is stronger evidence of the proposition,
because the Court of Queen’s Bench affirmatively rejected the Crown’s
argument that the witness’s statement should be admissible against the
co-venturers of the defendant responsible for wrongfully silencing the
witness. On the other hand, even this example is susceptible to Justice
Souter’s ambivalence in Giles, because there was no accusation of
conspiracy in Scaife, and therefore, co-conspirator imputation principles in
particular were not implicated. The academic commentary, however,
suggests that vicarious liability for substantive crimes did not become a
feature of conspiracy law until the twentieth century; this also suggests
that it did not exist at early common law.84 If the principle of imputed
substantive liability among conspirators did not exist in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, then courts in those centuries could not have
adopted that principle to impute forfeiture among conspirators as well. In
combination, the treatises, case law example, and apparent lack of vicarious
substantive liability among conspirators demonstrate that the Cherry rule
has no analog in early common law.
B. The CHERRY Rule Allows for Forfeiture of the Confrontation
Right Based on a Pretrial Determination of Guilt
In Giles, the Supreme Court overturned a California forfeiture-bywrongdoing statute in part because it allowed a witness’s testimonial outof-court statements to be admitted as evidence that a defendant was
guilty of murder based only on a pretrial finding that the defendant was
probably guilty of murdering the witness.85 Six justices held that this
provision for forfeiture of the confrontation right based on a pretrial

83. Giles, 554 U.S. at 380 (Souter, J., concurring in part).
84. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
85. Giles, 554 U.S. at 365; id. at 379 (Souter, J., concurring in part).
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determination of guilt rendered the statute unconstitutional, while only
four signed on to the Court’s historical analysis without reservation.86
Like the California statute rejected in Giles, the Cherry rule
premises forfeiture of the confrontation right on a pretrial determination
of guilt. The Cherry rule adopts Pinkerton liability wholesale: a
statement is admissible against a defendant if the defendant’s coconspirator’s wrongful act to silence a witness was within the scope and
in furtherance of the conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable.87 Under the
Cherry rule, then, if a witness’s statement is admissible against a
defendant, the defendant would also be liable for any crime committed
against the witness under Pinkerton. In other words, evidence of guilt
would be admissible against the defendant based on a pretrial
determination that the defendant is probably guilty of silencing the
witness through the actions of her co-conspirator. As Justice Souter
concluded in Giles, “[e]quity demands something more” than a bare,
circular conclusion that the defendant is guilty: the defendant in
particular must have acted with the purpose of making the witness
unavailable.88 This “something more” is missing from the Cherry rule.
Of course, other pretrial evidentiary questions frequently involve
determinations that a defendant participated in a conspiracy, but these
do not amount to a pretrial determination of guilt in the manner that the
Cherry rule does. As a particular example, the Federal Rules of
Evidence’s exclusion of co-conspirator statements from the hearsay rule
requires proof that the statements were made “by a coconspirator of a
party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.”89 This
Rule, therefore, necessarily requires proof before trial that the defendant
participated in a conspiracy. However, the admissibility of co-conspirator
statements does not rest on the theory that the wrongful nature of the
defendant’s conspiring amounts to forfeiture of any rights. Rather, the
statements are deemed the statements of the defendant herself, and are
therefore admissible as party admissions.90 “[T]heir admissibility in
evidence is the result of the adversary system,” not of any finding that
the defendant forfeited her confrontation right through criminal
wrongdoing.91
Rule 804(b)(6), unlike the exemption for co-conspirator statements,
is quasi-criminal in nature. At the foundation of Anglo-American

86. See id. at 379 (explaining that the Court’s exposition of the danger that forfeiture might rest
on a pretrial judicial determination of guilt, rather than the Court’s historical analysis, persuaded him
to join the Court’s opinion).
87. United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 820 (10th Cir. 2000).
88. Giles, 554 U.S. at 379 (Souter, J., concurring in part).
89. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).
90. Fed. R. Evid. 801 advisory committee’s note (1972).
91. Id.
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criminal law is the notion that individuals may be compelled to
compensate society for the public wrongs they commit through forfeiture
of their liberty and property.92 Criminal law is also meant to prevent
crime through the threefold goals of deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation.93 Weighty as these interests are, the high liberty costs that
attend a conviction require the government to prove its case against a
defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.94 Rule 804(b)(6) functions in the
same manner and has many of the same aims as the criminal law. As the
criminal punishment, in some sense, repays society for deliberate harms
worked against it, forfeiture by wrongdoing compensates somewhat for a
defendant’s wrongful action against a witness by stripping that defendant
of the benefits of her wrongdoing. Though the Rule may not incapacitate
or rehabilitate wrongdoers, it aims to deter wrongful conduct.95 Each of
these aims is accomplished by deeming the defendant to have forfeited
her constitutionally recognized right to confront witnesses. As the Court
recognized in Giles, to premise this forfeiture on nothing more than a
determination before trial, out of the presence of the jury, and by a mere
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is probably guilty of
whatever criminal act rendered the witness unavailable, is a burden that
the Confrontation Clause cannot bear.96 The more stringent requirement
set out in Giles ensures that forfeiture of the right to confront a witness
will rest not on a pretrial determination of guilt, but on a showing that
the defendant intended specifically to render the witness unavailable.

III. Even if the CHERRY Rule Does Not Offend the Confrontation
Clause, Due Process Constrains Its Application Short of the
Logical Extent of PINKERTON Co-Conspirator Liability
The Pinkerton decision expanded the scope of federal conspiracy
law to include liability for the substantive crimes of other conspirators.
While some commentators have supported this extension, most have
criticized it.97 In response to the shortcomings of the Pinkerton doctrine,
92. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *6.
93. Id. at *10–11.
94. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363–64 (1970).
95. E.g., United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 962 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Cherry,
217 F.3d 811, 820 (10th Cir. 2000).
96. Fed. R. Evid. 804 advisory committee’s note.
97. See, e.g., Vicarious Liability, supra note 71, at 375; Developments, supra note 71, at 996; Paul
Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy Law: Time to Turn Back from an Ever Expanding, Ever More Troubling
Area, 1 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 1, 7 n.28 (1992). The Model Penal Code rejected vicarious liability
for reasonably foreseeable crimes by co-conspirators. See Model Penal Code § 2.06(3) (1962)
(providing that complicity requires that the defendant have “the purpose of promoting or facilitating
the commission of the offense”); Model Penal Code § 2.04(3) cmt. 2 (Tentative Drafts Nos. 14,
1968) (noting that co-conspirator liability based on the probability of the substantive offense
“predicate[s] the liability on negligence when, for good reason, more is normally required”). Many
state court decisions have rejected Pinkerton as well. See State v. Stein, 27 P.3d 184, 189 (Wash. 2001)
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many circuit courts have intimated that due process constrains the
doctrine’s reach.98 Because the Cherry rule applies the Pinkerton
doctrine to Rule 804(b)(6) wholesale, the due process concerns identified
in Pinkerton apply with equal force to the Cherry rule. Accordingly, even
if the Cherry rule may be applied consistently with the Confrontation
Clause (as the Fourth Circuit attempted in Dinkins), the due process
limitations that circuit courts have applied to constrain Pinkerton should
constrain Cherry as well.
A. PINKERTON Allows for the Imputation of Substantive Liability
for Co-Conspirators’ Crimes
The U.S. Code presently defines conspiracy as the act of “two or
more persons conspir[ing] either to commit any offense against the
United States, or to defraud the United States.”99 This modern
formulation and all other versions of the crime of conspiracy in effect in
U.S. jurisdictions trace their origins to a statute enacted in England in
1304 by Edward I.100 Originally, the crime of conspiracy applied only to
agreements to bring a false indictment, though it expanded into
agreements to commit any crime whatsoever in the seventeenth
century.101 Indeed, in England and the United States, the crime swelled
so far as to include agreements to commit any act the courts deemed
immoral.102
That the act of one conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy is
considered the act of all was well settled at common law by the end of the
eighteenth century, though case law did not provide for vicarious liability

(en banc) (rejecting Pinkerton as “incompatible with Washington law” because it allows for complicity
in a co-conspirator’s act without knowledge of it); State ex rel. Woods v. Cohen, 844 P.2d 1147, 1151
(Ariz. 1992) (en banc) (concluding that Pinkerton is not within Arizona’s “statutory universe”); People v.
McGee, 399 N.E.2d 1177, 1182 (N.Y. 1979) (“[I]t is repugnant to our system of jurisprudence, where guilt
is generally personal to the defendant, to impose punishment, not for the socially harmful agreement to
which the defendant is a party, but for substantive offenses in which he did not participate.”).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 850 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Castaneda, 9 F.3d 761, 768 (9th Cir. 1993).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2014).
100. Sayre, supra note 69, at 395–96 (citing Third Ordinance of Conspirators, 1304, 33 Edw. 1 (Eng.)).
101. Id. at 400.
102. Id. at 400–07. More recently, the Supreme Court determined that a state statute criminalizing
conspiracies “to commit acts injurious to public morals” was likely unconstitutionally vague and
overbroad, but declined to find fault with criminalizing an agreement to commit an act that was not
itself criminal. See Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95, 9798 (1948) (remanding to the Utah Supreme Court
to determine whether the statute could be construed narrowly). The principle that a conspiracy is
criminal even if its purpose is not is expressed in the federal conspiracy statute, which penalizes
conspiracies to “defraud the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2014); Phillip E. Johnson, The
Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 Calif. L. Rev. 1137, 1144–45 (1973).
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for substantive crimes.103 Instead, by the first half of the twentieth
century, federal courts had come to use the imputation principle
(1) to establish as the act of all members of the alleged conspiracy the
overt act required by the federal conspiracy statute, (2) to show the
extent and duration of the conspiracy in relation to all the conspirators,
or (3) as a rule of evidence to connect all the defendants with the crime
charged.104

Before 1946, federal courts declined to extend the theory of conspiracy
to hold one conspirator liable for a substantive offense committed by
another conspirator.105

1.

Pinkerton Extended Co-Conspirator Liability to Substantive
Crimes by Co-Conspirators That Were Not the Object of the
Conspiracy

The potential scope of criminal conspiracy law expanded
considerably with the Supreme Court’s 1946 opinion in Pinkerton.106
Walter and Daniel Pinkerton appealed from convictions for multiple
counts of Internal Revenue Code violations, and one count each of
conspiracy.107 Daniel argued that no evidence connected him to the
substantive crimes in the indictment.108 In fact, he showed that he was
serving time in a penitentiary when Walter committed some of the
103. East, supra note 70, at 97. The principle is stated in a chapter explaining the crime of high
treason, but the text makes clear that it applied to all conspiracies. Id. at 96; see United States v.
Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460, 469 (1827) (“Each [conspirator] is deemed to consent to, or
command, what is done by any other in furtherance of the common object.”); Gardner v. Preston,
2 Day 205, 210 (Conn. 1805) (one conspirator’s act in pursuit of the objective of the conspiracy is
deemed the act of all conspirators).
104. Vicarious Liability, supra note 71, at 375; see id. at 375 nn.36–38 (collecting cases). Of course,
at present, the rule that a statement by a conspirator within the scope and in furtherance of the
conspiracy is admissible against all other conspirators is codified within the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E).
105. Vicarious Liability, supra note 71, at 375; Developments, supra note 71, at 993–94. As noted
in Developments, at the time that the Supreme Court decided Pinkerton, the Third Circuit had
declined to hold that each participant in a conspiracy was liable for the substantive criminal acts of
other conspirators. Id. at 994 (citing United States v. Sall, 116 F.2d 745 (3d Cir. 1940)). In Sall, the
Third Circuit held that proof of the defendant’s membership in a conspiracy to conceal alcohol was not
sufficient to show him substantively liable for the concealment itself: “It is the act of concealment with
criminal intent, and not the previous agreement, which is the gist of that offense.” Sall, 116 F.2d at 747.
The Pinkerton brothers relied on Sall for the proposition that participation in a conspiracy did not, on
its own, render all conspirators vicariously liable for a single conspirator’s substantive crime. Brief for
the Petitioners at 19–20, Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946) (No. 719). In rejecting Sall,
the Supreme Court established throughout the federal courts for the first time that conspirators are
vicariously liable for their co-conspirators’ criminal acts carried out in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 64647.
106. 328 U.S. at 640; see Vicarious Liability, supra note 71, at 373–74 (Pinkerton abolished the
common law merger rule and provided that a conspirator may be liable for criminal acts of other
conspirators).
107. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 641.
108. Id. at 645.
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offenses.109 The Court held that Daniel’s mere participation in the
conspiracy was enough to render him liable for all criminal acts by his coconspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy.110 In reaching this
conclusion, the Court summarized the principle that “an overt act of one
partner may be the act of all.”111 Because the overt act required by the
federal conspiracy statute could be supplied by the act of a coconspirator, the Court reasoned, “other acts in furtherance of the
conspiracy” should also be attributed to all participants.112
The Court recognized that the broad scope of conspiracy liability
lent itself to abuses and potential injustice, even as it expanded that
scope in Pinkerton.113 Perhaps in response to this potential, the Court
suggested that a conspirator is liable for another conspirator’s
substantive offense only if the offense was “in furtherance of the
conspiracy” and “within the scope of the unlawful project.”114 The Court
added an additional limitation: the offense must have been reasonably
foreseeable “as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful
agreement.”115

2.

Justifications of the Pinkerton Rule Rest Primarily on a
“General Partnership” Theory

Justice Douglas’s opinion for the Court drew heavily on the notion
that a conspiracy is a “partnership in crime.”116 Like partners in a
business enterprise, Justice Douglas reasoned, each conspirator should
be deemed responsible for each other conspirator’s actions within the
scope of the conspiracy.117 For this principle, rather than citing opinions
interpreting conspiracy law in general, Justice Douglas referred to
antitrust cases involving incorporated business entities charged with
109. Id. at 648 (Rutledge, J., dissenting in part).
110. Id. at 647.
111. Id. at 646 (citation omitted).
112. Id. at 647.
113. Id. at 644 n.4. The Court cited an observation by the Conference of Senior Circuit Judges in
1925 that prosecutors often inject conspiracy charges into indictments in order to convert misdemeanors
into felonies or to gain advantage of special rules of evidence that make conspiracy cases “difficult to try
without prejudice to an innocent defendant.” Id. (quoting Resolutions of Conference of Senior Circuit
Judges, 11 A.B.A. J. 453, 453 (1925)). The Court brushed these concerns aside, noting that it “[did] not
find that practice reflected in this present case.” Id. Of course, the modern federal conspiracy statute
provides that a conspiracy to commit a misdemeanor is also punished as a misdemeanor. 18 U.S.C.
§ 371 (2014).
114. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 647–48.
115. Id. at 648. The Court did not affirmatively state that each of these elements is required, but
merely suggested that it would face “[a] different case” if any of them were absent. Id. at 647–48.
However, each circuit now requires that a conspirator’s substantive crime be within the scope and in
furtherance of the conspiracy and reasonably foreseeable in order for other conspirators to be
vicariously liable for it. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
116. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 644.
117. Id. at 646–47.
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colluding to fix prices.118 Justice Douglas did not explain why the broad
principle of vicarious liability for antitrust offenses, which by their nature
include an element of collusion, should expand to encompass any
substantive crime committed in furtherance of any conspiracy.
Later commentators have expanded on the agency rationale in
Pinkerton. As an agent of the principal, an accomplice (or co-conspirator)
“is in agreement with the principal’s actions,” and “therefore worthy of
punishment.”119 However, this agency rationale falters in the criminal
context where a co-conspirator’s contribution is tenuous or insubstantial.120
Similarly, in joining a conspiracy, a conspirator forfeits her personal
autonomy, effectively saying, “your acts are my acts.”121 Holding this
conspirator liable for her co-conspirators’ reasonably foreseeable acts is
therefore permissible.122
B. Criticism of PINKERTON
The first vigorous criticism of the Pinkerton rule followed on the
majority opinion’s heels.123 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rutledge
reminded the Court that Daniel Pinkerton was incarcerated when his
brother carried out many of the substantive crimes, and no evidence
suggested that Daniel aided in or even knew about them.124 The dissent
invoked a number of “dangers for abuse” in the state of conspiracy law
before Pinkerton, including “[t]he looseness with which the charge may
be proved, the almost unlimited scope of vicarious responsibility for
others’ acts which follows once agreement is shown, [and] the
psychological advantages of such trials for securing convictions by
attributing to one proof against another.”125 Expanding the scope of
conspiracy liability to include substantive offenses in furtherance of the
conspiracy exacerbates these dangers.126 Justice Rutledge also took issue
with the Court’s reliance on “private commercial law” to expand the

118. Id. at 644 (citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 166–67 (1940) (oil
companies charged with conspiring to fix gasoline prices)); id. at 647 (citing United States v. Kissel,
218 U.S. 601, 605–06 (1910) (lender charged with conspiring with sugar company to lend money in
exchange for a controlling share of a rival sugar company)).
119. Audrey Rogers, Accomplice Liability for Unintentional Crimes: Remaining Within the
Constraints of Intent, 31 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1351, 135556 n.13 (1998) (citing Joshua Dressler,

Reassessing the Theoretical Underpinnings of Accomplice Liability: New Solutions to an Old
Problem, 37 Hastings L.J. 91, 110 (1985)).
120. Id.
121. Dressler, supra note 119, at 111.
122. Kimberly R. Bird, Note, The Natural and Probable Consequences Doctrine: “Your Acts Are
My Acts!”, 34 W. St. U. L. Rev. 43, 49 (2006).
123. See Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 648 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting in part).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 650.
126. Id.
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vicarious liability of business partners into “the criminal field.”127 To
Justice Rutledge, guilt of a crime “remains personal, not vicarious.”128
Justice Jackson, a former Attorney General, added to Justice
Rutledge’s concerns in his concurring opinion in Krulewitch v. United
States.129 Justice Jackson devoted much of his opinion to expounding the
abuses of conspiracy law in general, particularly the incentives it gives
prosecutors to rely on it excessively and the dangers of prejudice it poses
to defendants.130 He saved specific criticisms for the Court’s holding in
Pinkerton, however.131 Like Justice Rutledge, Justice Jackson observed
that Pinkerton allows a conspirator to suffer conviction of a substantive
crime, effectively becoming an aider or abettor, despite no evidence that
he had control over or even knew of its commission.132
Many commentators have noticed that Pinkerton allows for
conviction of a serious crime based not on a finding of whatever mental
state the crime requires, but on mere negligence.133 The phrase
“reasonably foreseeable” invokes the “reasonable person” of tort
liability, and implies a broader scope of foreseeable consequences than
does a requirement of intent or knowledge.134 In effect, Pinkerton
renders a conspirator criminally liable for any crime that she “should
have known” her co-conspirators might commit; that is, if she was
negligent with regard to its likelihood.135 In basing liability on mere
negligence, Pinkerton punishes “a conspirator who never agreed to,
aided, or participated in, the commission of the collateral offense.”136
127. Id. at 651–52.
128. Id.
129. Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). Justice
Jackson served as Attorney General from 1940 to 1941, when he was appointed to the Supreme Court
to replace Justice Hughes. Jeffrey D. Hockett, New Deal Justice: The Constitutional
Jurisprudence of Hugo L. Black, Felix Frankfurter, and Robert h. Jackson 23536 (1996). He
took no part in the decision in Pinkerton. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 648.
130. Krulewitch, 336 U.S. at 445–46, 452–54 (Jackson, J., concurring).
131. Id. at 451.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Developments, supra note 71, at 996; Marcus, supra note 97, at 7 n.28.
134. Developments, supra note 71, at 996.
135. Marcus, supra note 97, at 7 n.28.
136. Id. When early drafts of the Model Penal Code rejected Pinkerton-style co-conspirator
liability, among the reasons given in the comments was Pinkerton’s provision for liability for serious
crimes based on a showing of nothing more than negligence. Model Penal Code § 2.04(3) cmt. 2
(Tentative Drafts Nos. 1–4, 1968). Of course, negligence itself is the requisite mental state for some
substantive crimes, such as negligent homicide. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 210.4 (1985). For a
negligent crime, to hold a conspirator liable based on the reasonable foreseeability that a coconspirator would commit it might not seem incongruous. However, the negligence proscribed in, say,
negligent homicide statutes is not the negligence that Pinkerton contemplates. A negligent homicide
statute targets deviations from the standard of care that a reasonable person would take with regard to
the risk of inadvertently causing death. See id. § 210.4 explanatory note (definition of negligent
homicide); id. § 2.02(2)(d) (definition of “negligently”). Pinkerton charges conspirators with liability in
any reasonably foreseeable crime by a co-conspirator. The Model Penal Code rejected its application
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The bulk of Pinkerton’s criticism has rested on the broad scope of
its application. Punishing one conspirator for the substantive crime of
another, particularly a serious one, based on nothing more than
membership in the same conspiracy leads to serious proportionality
problems.137 A defendant’s only defenses to a co-conspirator’s
substantive crime will be that the crime does not satisfy the elements of
Pinkerton or that the defendant withdrew from the conspiracy before the
crime was committed.138 The potential scope of a conspiracy and the acts
that might be “in furtherance” of it are so broad, however, that few
criminal acts by co-conspirators will fall outside them.139 Withdrawal is
also difficult to prove, because it requires evidence of an affirmative act
to defeat the object of the conspiracy;140 mere inaction will not suffice.141
C. The Eleventh and Ninth Circuits Have Concluded That Due
Process Limits the Reach of Vicarious Liability Under PINKERTON
As the Pinkerton rule grew in popularity among state and federal
prosecutors in the 1970s, federal courts began to address their concerns
with its breadth in terms of due process limits.142 The first decisions to
suggest a due process limit to vicarious liability of conspirators did so
vaguely and in passing, implying that Pinkerton itself may represent a
due process “floor.”143 In later decisions, several circuits began to
expound the idea that due process constrains Pinkerton’s application

even to crimes of negligence, providing instead that a co-conspirator or accomplice “command[] or
assist[] in performing the behavior that is reckless or negligent.” Model Penal Code § 2.04(3) cmt.
n.28 (Tentative Drafts Nos. 1–4, 1968).
137. Joshua Dressler, The Jurisprudence of Death by Another: Accessories and Capital
Punishment, 51 U. Colo. L. Rev. 17, 56 (1979).
138. Vicarious Liability, supra note 71, at 377–78.
139. Id. at 377. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines restrict the scope of Pinkerton somewhat by
defining “relevant conduct” for the purpose of determining the base offense level to include “all
reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal
activity.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.3 (2013). “Jointly undertaken criminal activity”
in turn is defined not by the scope of the entire conspiracy, but only by the activity in which the
individual defendant agreed to participate. Id. § 1B1.3 cmt. 2. The Sentencing Guidelines, of course,
do not state principles of liability, and the comments to § 1B1.3 state that the principles that determine
the applicable guideline range are not necessarily the same as those that determine when a defendant
will be liable as a conspirator. Id. In any event, however, the Guidelines represent another example of
retreat from Pinkerton.
140. Vicarious Liability, supra note 71, at 377–78 (citing Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 369
(1912)). At least one commentator has argued that this construction of the withdrawal defense is an
unconstitutional shifting of the burden of proof to the defendant. Barton D. Day, Note, The
Withdrawal Defense to Criminal Conspiracy: An Unconstitutional Allocation of the Burden of Proof,
51 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 420, 441 (1983).
141. Vicarious Liability, supra note 71, at 377.
142. Alex Kreit, Vicarious Criminal Liability and the Constitutional Dimensions of Pinkerton,
57 Am. U. L. Rev. 585, 598 (2008).
143. Id. at 591, 599–602.
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short of the doctrine’s logical extent.144 If the due process clauses restrain
the extent to which conspirators may be held liable for their coconspirators’ crimes under Pinkerton, then they similarly restrain the
extent of vicarious responsibility for acts of witness tampering under
Cherry, which adopts Pinkerton wholesale.
An example of an early case reading Pinkerton as a due process
floor for co-conspirator liability is the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in United
States v. Decker.145 In Decker, two defendants appealed from their
convictions under Pinkerton of drug-trafficking offenses committed by
co-conspirators.146 The court endorsed the suggestion of a dissenting
opinion in an earlier Fifth Circuit case that vicarious criminal liability
“may raise obvious due process objections.”147 Nevertheless, the court
upheld the conviction because the elements of Pinkerton were
satisfied.148 This necessarily implies that the court found Pinkerton’s
requirement of reasonable foreseeability sufficient to satisfy any due
process concerns arising from vicarious criminal liability. Later Fifth
Circuit decisions, as well as decisions from the Fourth and Sixth Circuits,
have taken a similar view.149
Courts began to move beyond treating Pinkerton merely as a due
process floor for co-conspirator responsibility, and instead suggesting
that Pinkerton itself violates due process when carried to its logical
extent.150 In United States v. Alvarez, a drug trafficker killed a federal
agent during an undercover buy-bust operation.151 Several conspirators
were convicted of the murder under Pinkerton, and argued on appeal
that the killing was so attenuated from the object of the conspiracy that
the convictions violated due process.152 The Eleventh Circuit first noted
three categories of crimes for which a co-conspirator may be found liable
under Pinkerton. The first two are common subjects of Pinkerton
convictions: substantive crimes that were already the object of the

144. Mark Noferi, Towards Attenuation: A “New” Due Process Limit on Pinkerton Conspiracy
Liability, 33 Am. J. Crim. L. 91, 128–29, 142–43 (2006).
145. 543 F.2d 1102 (5th Cir. 1976); see Kreit, supra note 142, at 600.
146. Decker, 543 F.2d at 1103.
147. Id. (citing Park v. Huff, 506 F.2d 849, 864 (5th Cir. 1975) (Thornburry, J., dissenting)).
148. Id. at 1104.
149. See United States v. Christian, 942 F.2d 363, 36768 (6th Cir. 1991) (concluding that defendants’
convictions under Pinkerton for firearm possession were supported by the reasonably foreseeable
eventuality that guns will be carried or used during drug deals, and therefore that the convictions did not
raise due process concerns); United States v. Chorman, 910 F.2d 102, 112 (4th Cir. 1990) (concluding that
a conviction under Pinkerton did not “run afoul of possible due process limitations”); United States v.
Moreno, 588 F.2d 490, 493 (5th Cir. 1979) (acknowledging that “vicarious guilt may have due process
limitations,” but upholding the conviction because the co-conspirators’ act was not “so attenuated as to
give [the court] due process concerns”); Kreit, supra note 142, at 603–04.
150. United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 850 (11th Cir. 1985); see Noferi, supra note 144, at 130.
151. Alvarez, 755 F.2d at 838–39.
152. Id. at 83940.
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conspiracy, such as drug possession during a drug-trafficking conspiracy,
and crimes which facilitate the achievement of a conspiracy’s goals, such
as firearm possession during a drug-trafficking conspiracy.153 The third,
however, was not a common basis for Pinkerton liability: crimes that,
though reasonably foreseeable, are an unintended consequence of the
conspiracy.154 The court observed that convictions of unintended crimes
under Pinkerton, though technically consistent with the doctrine, may
offend due process.155 The court upheld the convictions in Alvarez,
however, because the conspirators were “more than ‘minor’ participants
in the drug conspiracy,” and the murder was “not so attenuated as to run
afoul of the potential due process limitations on the Pinkerton
doctrine.”156 The Tenth Circuit subsequently held that due process
constrained Pinkerton liability in declining to extend it to a first-degree
murder that was not an object of the conspiracy.157
The Ninth Circuit recognized another due process boundary cutting
across Pinkerton liability: a defendant’s conviction of a substantive
offense under Pinkerton offends due process if the offense was not
reasonably foreseeable to that defendant based on her own involvement
in the conspiracy.158 In United States v. Castaneda, the defendant was
convicted of seven counts of using a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) on
a Pinkerton liability theory.159 The predicate offense supporting one
count was the drug conspiracy at the heart of the prosecution, and that
for the other six was possession of a controlled substance with intent to
distribute.160 The only piece of evidence connecting the defendant to the
drug conspiracy was six recorded phone calls.161 In one call, while
engaging in small talk with a customer of the operation, the defendant
relayed remarks by her husband about an intended drug transaction.162
In others, the defendant merely related information about difficulties her
husband and other conspirators had encountered.163 The Ninth Circuit
acknowledged that firearm possession is generally reasonably foreseeable
in a drug distribution conspiracy, but found that this “drugs-guns nexus” did
not apply where a conspirator’s involvement in the conspiracy is so

153. Id. at 850 n.24 (citing United States v. Luis-Gonzalez, 719 F.2d 1539, 1545 n.4 (11th Cir. 1983);
United States v. Brant, 448 F. Supp. 781, 782 (W.D. Pa. 1978)).
154. Id. at 850.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 850–51.
157. United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 818 (10th Cir. 2000).
158. United States v. Castaneda, 9 F.3d 761, 768 (9th Cir. 1993).
159. Id. at 764.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 767.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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minor that firearm possession was not foreseeable to that conspirator.164
According to the court, the defendant was a “paradigm example” of such
minor involvement, and therefore her convictions violated due process.165
In the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits, then, a conspirator must play
more than a minor role in the conspiracy in order to be held vicariously
liable for the substantive crimes of co-conspirators. The bounds of this
due process limit are somewhat different between the two circuits. In the
Eleventh, a minor participant avoids liability only if her co-conspirators’
substantive crime resulted from an unexpected contingency, while the
Ninth Circuit asks whether imputing liability to her would be fair in light
of the nature of her participation. In other words, the Eleventh Circuit’s
approach focuses on the nature of the substantive crime, while the Ninth
Circuit focuses on the nature of the defendant’s conduct. These small
differences are variations on a common principle: Even where Pinkerton
is satisfied, the due process clause limits the degree to which a minor
participant in a conspiracy may be deemed culpable for her coconspirators’ substantive crimes.
D. The Due Process Concerns That Constrain PINKERTON
Substantive Liability Should Constrain Application of the
CHERRY Rule as Well
Because it imports Pinkerton vicarious liability wholesale, the
criticisms that courts and commentators have leveled at Pinkerton apply
equally to the Cherry rule. The wrongful conduct of the defendant’s coconspirator is attributed to the defendant where that conduct is merely
reasonably foreseeable, regardless of whether it was an unintended
consequence of the unlawful agreement.166 This extremely broad standard
could permit prosecutors to introduce otherwise inadmissible and highly
damaging declarations against the defendant even where the defendant
played no role in the wrongful conduct that rendered the declarant
unavailable. The Cherry rule therefore gives rise to the same “dangers
for abuse” the dissenting justices described in Pinkerton.167
The breadth of the Cherry rule also leads to the same proportionality
concerns that underlie Pinkerton co-conspirator liability. Like Pinkerton,
the Cherry rule rests on mere reasonable foreseeability, the hallmark of
ordinary civil negligence. To be sure, forfeiture of the protections of the
Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rule is not as severe a
consequence as the loss of liberty that may follow a conviction under
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Though the Tenth Circuit declined to expand Pinkerton substantive liability to unexpected
first-degree murders, it did not exclude unexpected efforts to silence witnesses from its application of
Pinkerton to Rule 804(b)(6). United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 818 (10th Cir. 2000).
167. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 650–52 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting in part).
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Pinkerton. Forfeiture is nonetheless a punishment, imposed with the

aims of stripping a wrongdoer of the benefits of her wrongdoing and
deterring future wrongful conduct.168 Denying a defendant important
trial rights based on conduct with regard to which she was merely negligent
stretches the forfeiture rule’s equitable rationale to an uncomfortable
degree, as a defendant cannot consciously take advantage of wrongful
conduct of which she is unaware. The Cherry rule also does not mesh
well with the forfeiture doctrine’s deterrent aim, as punishments have
little value in deterring negligence.169
Like Pinkerton co-conspirator liability in general, then, the Cherry
rule risks holding minor participants accountable for conduct that is
culpable to a degree well out of proportion to their own minimal
involvement. Under the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning in Alvarez, for
example, introducing a murdered witness’s statements against, say, minor
participants in a drug trafficking conspiracy who were neither involved in
nor aware of the killing would offend due process. In such a case, the
wrongful conduct that rendered the witness unavailable would be too far
attenuated from the object of the conspiracy to be fairly attributed to
conspirators who played only a minimal role.170 The Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning in Castaneda may also be easily translated to the Cherry
context. Where a minor participant in a conspiracy could not reasonably
foresee a co-conspirator’s wrongful action to silence a witness in light of
her role, attributing that co-conspirator’s conduct to her for forfeiture
purposes is inconsistent with due process. Where a co-conspirator’s
action against a witness is too attenuated from the defendant, whether in
light of the object of the conspiracy or the defendant’s role in it,
conviction under Pinkerton and forfeiture of hearsay and confrontation
objections under Cherry deprive the defendant of due process in the same
manner. Federal courts should apply the due process limits identified in
Alvarez and Castaneda in the Cherry context, and ensure that minor players
will not suffer dire evidentiary consequences based on misconduct of
which they were unaware and over which they had no control.

168. See Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 366 (2008) (noting that the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing
rule rests on the principle that “no one shall be permitted to take advantage of his wrong”) (citing
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 159 (1878)); United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 962 (7th
Cir. 2002) (noting that the forfeiture rule is intended “to deter criminals from intimidating or ‘taking
care of’ potential witnesses against them”).
169. Cf. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009) (holding that Fourth Amendment
violations resulting from simple negligence are not “sufficiently deliberate that [the exclusionary rule]
can meaningfully deter” them). But see id. at 153 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
imposition of consequences for negligent behavior encourages greater care).
170. Cf. United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 85051 (11th Cir. 1985).
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Conclusion
The Cherry rule, like the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine in
general, is aimed at “abhorrent behavior ‘which strikes at the heart of the
system of justice itself.’”171 Presumably, most would agree that
defendants should not be permitted to purchase a witness’s silence with
violence or other wrongful conduct. But by imputing forfeiture of the
confrontation right against every conspirator who should reasonably
have foreseen that one among them would wrongfully silence a witness,
the Cherry rule cuts too wide a swath. The rule should be abolished
altogether, or, at the very least, limited in the manner that some circuit
courts have limited Pinkerton.
The Cherry rule is incompatible with the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Confrontation Clause. In Crawford, the Court tied
the confrontation right to how common law courts understood it when
the Sixth Amendment was ratified. At that time, it did not appear that
those common law courts imputed forfeiture by wrongdoing among coconspirators. Commentators’ observations that few courts recognized
vicarious liability for substantive crimes of co-conspirators before
Pinkerton support this conclusion. Moreover, like the California forfeiture
statute that the Court rejected in Giles, the Cherry rule premises
forfeiture of a defendant’s confrontation right on a pretrial
determination of guilt. The modern understanding of the confrontation
right leaves no place for the Cherry rule. For that reason, district and
circuit courts presented with a choice of whether to adopt the Cherry
rule should reject it, and the rest should overturn the opinions that have
adopted it.
Even if the Cherry rule can coexist peacefully with the Confrontation
Clause, due process concerns restrain its application short of the logical
extent of Pinkerton. The courts of appeals have identified two due
process limits on the scope of Pinkerton liability that should apply to
Cherry as well. In Alvarez, the Eleventh Circuit observed that convictions
under Pinkerton of minor conspirators for substantive crimes that were
an unintended consequence of the conspiracy and attenuated from its
objective violate due process. In Castaneda, the Ninth Circuit concluded
that due process requires courts to measure the foreseeability of coconspirators’ substantive crimes by the extent of the defendant’s own
participation, and not by the overarching objective of the conspiracy
itself. Courts that have adopted the Cherry rule should observe these due
process limits, and determine whether the extent and character of a
conspirator’s participation in the conspiracy is sufficient to justify holding

171. Fed. R. Evid. 804 advisory committee’s note (1997) (quoting United States v. Mastrangelo,
693 F.2d 269, 273 (2d Cir. 1982)).
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her accountable for her co-conspirator’s wrongful conduct against a
witness.

